20 June, 2005

Wealth gap and and privatised land ownership: original text

Polarisation of rich and poor due to inability to privatise land ownership

21 January 2005

2005121日,新浪财经与CCER共同召开第二届中国经济展望论坛圆桌研讨会,本次研讨会是在中国经济展望论坛十场互联网在线讨论的基础上进行的。论坛专集《展望中国2005》新书首发式也同时举行。

秦晖:我对上一个阶段的讨论谈一点感想。刚 才吴敬琏老师和左大培两位老师谈了自己的观点,对这个问题提出了不同的意见,我们讨论经济发展战略,尤其是在经济学家的圈子里,往往忽视了经济外体制的制 约,他们两个人说的问题在我看来是一个问题,就是为什么中国的要素价格被压低?要素价格被压力,有些问题是可以解决的,是因为中国的劳动力价格特别低,但 是土地的要素价格特别低,我认为这就是非常反常的现象。

有人说这纯粹是因为最典型的原因,比如说珠江三角洲农民工的工资为什么那么低? 批判学家认为既然是这样,就应该组织劳动力的流动,政府认为既然是这样,就与我无关。
但是,我们都知道,尤其是
2004年 民工荒明显的表现出所谓的劳务价格偏低其实是有非经济因素的,在我看来就是三个非经济因素:第一,集体谈判权的缺失,近几年来我们商会会制的步伐远远低于 工会会制的步伐。第二,我国农业比较效益之低,这的确是有人为因素的,一般情况下来说,在我们现在的发展阶段中,农业是个弱势产业,这是毋庸置疑的。但是,至少在前几年,农业的弱势程度要比正常条件下更为弱势,其中很重要的原因是在前几年税制改革以后,很明显的堡垒的税收,就是农民的负担比一般人的税收更大。因此,税费改革之后耕地抛荒的现象有所缓解。
第三,市场准入的限制,当时农民工进入的地方只是限于很少的地方。
这几个因素是非经济的因素,刚才一些人在争究竟正确的作用是不是应该有,或者说政府是不是失灵?
我觉得即使人们认为政府应该起作用的领域,我们当前政府的作用,有时候恰恰是相反的,而不是很多人认为政府应该起作用的方向,比如说土地问题,关于土地问题,现在很多人都说土地私有制是不能搞的,我对土地私有制是不是最佳的制度选择也是有怀疑的。
但是,问题在于现在很多
三农问题专家所讲的土地不宜私有的说法和政府讲的土地不宜私有的说法是不同的,说中国一土地私有就会产生社会危机,导致战争。
政府官员说如果不搞了土地私有,中国的经济就不会发展那么快,如果政府对土地的干预是按照这种方式,恰恰可以说,正是由于土地不能私有才会造成土地兼并、两极分化,有可能造成农民战争的危险,也恰恰是由相反的原因造成的。


1]正是由于土地不能私有才造成两极分化 http://finance.sina.com.cn/economist/jingjixueren/20050121/18301313626.shtml

Awareness of the Peasants is Awareness of China

Interview with Qin Hu, Professor of History, Qinghua

Liu Guowang, Zhongguo Gaige 22 November 2000

--Translated by David Kelly (daikaili@yahoo.com.au)

I first met Professor Qin Hui at an international academic conference in May 1999. His speech, while emotional, was based on reason and evidence, very ‘disciplined.’ Everyone present was astonished. We later found in fact that his articles often appeared in influential media. The range of topics they touched on was broad, the style trenchant, the views profound and saturated with an intellectual’s abundant social conscience, and a contemporary citizen’s sense of responsibility. We learned then that Professor Qin is one of the foremost representatives of agrarian studies in China today, and holds a position in the History Department of Qinghua University.

The most obvious feature of Professor Qin’s work in agrarian studies is his mast­ery of what he calls “is” and “isms.”[1] In the view of some traditional scholars, this may not be ‘agrarian studies’ properly speaking, but in his view, this is precisely the kind of awareness of national cond­it­ions that a Chinese scholar needs to be equip­ped with. Regarding "issues and isms’', he says that the Chinese revolution was started by the peasants. Yet years later the same peasants, seen as “small and private”[2] accepted the terms of agricultural collectivisation quite submissively. In the late 1970’s, the peas­ants of Xiaogang Village, Fengyang County, Anhui, set off the shockwaves of rural reform with their “18 bloody handprints”, and today the town and village enterprises (TVEs) which “occupy half the country” are once again [successful] out of all reckoning. Phenomena like the tide of rural workers and the switch to the TVE system are too much to keep up with. So are the Chinese peasants conservative or backward?

Clearly, to solve the specious “problem” set out above we need an “ism” deeply rooted in Chinese social strata and modern agrarian studies. Using much concrete research into the traditional and modern Chinese countryside, and the results of mod­ern agrarian research into Chinese villages and their society, Professor Qin has work­ed out a new delinea­tion. The distinction between the traditional “peasant” and the modern “farmer” lies in the fact that the former “is subject to control by external pow­ers”. In peasant society, products and labour are never directly exchanged by the producers, but rather are supplied offer to centres where they are redistributed, “Pea­s­­­ant” in this sense ceases to be an occupational or regional concept and is instead so­cially defined. Peasants are may not be people who work on the land, and workers on the land may not be peasants. In other words, rather than peasant society being one which engages in agriculture for a living, it is a non-citizen society, non-status, and a society based on public institutions (gonggongti). Hence either criticising the peas­ants’ “backwardness” or praising their “purity” from the point of view of an urban­ite are equally ridiculous. Faced with a citizen society, in either case the peas­ant needs to be converted to a “complete individual.” Thus, the “peasant quest­ion” is essentially the question of China’s conversion from a peasant society to a cit­izen soc­iety, in which case “simply” working on the “three nongs”[3] or “letting peasants speak for themselves” is clearly helpless.

The peasant question is not the peasants’ own problem: its origins lie in the city. Looking at the peasant question, which is ubiquitous both in town and country, from this starting point, we sudden­ly see the light. Professor Qin asks, which of the obvious problems today of peasant incomes, tax burdens, migrant rural labour, agricultural land, etc, really originates in the country­side? Which of them do not involve the issue of peasants’ rights as citizens? Take the issue of reducing exact­ions on the peasantry: currently rural tax reform is an important policy and this is of course a good thing. Yet it should also be noted that as well as eliminating a number of unreason­able exactions, in fact there is a combination of existing regular taxes and miscellaneous taxes, so that clarifying the farmers’ burden is merely a measure to treat the symptoms. Such approaches have been repeatedly taken in China’s history, but because complementary measures to treat the root of the illness have never accompanied them, in the end they turn out to be a prelude to another round of increased ex­actions.

Qin Hui says, he in no way opposing the tax reforms, I is only saying that such reforms alone are not enough, they must be combined with complementary reforms of the government org­ans, protection of peasants’ rights, and so on. Take also the case of rural labourers: in fundamental terms this is a question of the peasants’ rights as citizens to work and to move from place to place. But, under a variety of pretexts, some localities callously adopt measures to limit the rural workers’ legitimate rights. While increasing the costs of coming into the cities, this further exacerbates the so-called “peasant question”, and only serves to give still further cause to increase the curbs on rural workers.

Professor Qin’s ability to create such a new form of agrarian studies is bound up with his unique personal history and intellectual trajectory. Born to an intellectual family in Guangxi in 1953 after ‘graduating’ from junior high school at the age of 15 he embarked on over 9 years as a youth sent down to a rural production team, to what he calls the “university of the paddy fields”. This period vastly influenced his subsequ­ent career as a scholar. In those years with no tertiary entrance examination to stimulate scholars with the promise of recruitment to academic careers, and no drive to make a name, the only motivation for study was the desire for knowledge and truth for their own sake. Whatever interested him he pursued without regard for disciplin­ary boundaries. Meanwhile, his interests were generated by what appeared to him as issues. Moving from interest to issue to research became his mode of scholarship.

In 1978 with an astonishing ‘three level leap’ he qualified for direct admission as a graduate student in the Lanzhou University History Department. Working under China’s renowned agrarian historian Professor Zhao Lisheng he embarked on the difficult road of agrarian history research. In the subsequent 20 years or so, following his interests and tacking problems he has ventured into economics, politics, ideas, culture; matters ancient and modern, Chinese and foreign—wherever there is an issue he is to be found hunting for clues to it.

As his scholarship is of the ‘love of knowledge’ type, Professor Qin has never been one to follow trends, and indeed has a tendency to buck them. When cultural fever was on everyone’s lips as ‘ism’ characterising the late 1980s, he did nothing to add fuel to it, but instead pursued his ‘issues’; but when intellectual trends changed direction in the 1990s, with a return to textual research, Qin Hui brought up ‘isms’. In his own words, his attitude to life and scholarship and value criteria derive from the responsibilities of a modern citizen in a China which is in the process of transition.



[1] [Trans.] This is a conscious and ironical reference to polemics in the early 1920s between the liberal Hu Shi (1891-1962) and the Communists including Li Dazhao (1883-1927).

[2] [Trans.] 一小二私 yixiao ersi: the opposite of Mao’s call for communist institutions to be ‘big and public’ (yida ergong 一大二公).

[3] Nongye, nongmin, nongcun: “agriculture, the peasantry, the rural village community:” a view of some social scientists (notably Wen Tiejun), that economic models of agriculture must be integrated with knowledge of rural sociology and politics.